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I. D i v o r c e :  T h e n  a n d  Now
Between the mid-1960s and 1979 the crude divorce rate in the 
United States more than doubled.1 Although divorce had increased at a 
steady rate for more than the previous 100 years, the mid-1960s 
marked the beginning of an unprecedented boom.^ Despite modest 
declines over the last twenty years,3 the divorce rate remains high: 
about one out of two new marriages will fail.4
The 1970s also witnessed the proliferation of easy divorce laws. 
California passed the landmark no-fault divorce law in 1970,5 with
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Kr f /  , Wing SUlt by m i  AsPiring divorcees no longer 
had to establish fault m a court of law. Instead, a couple had merely to
acknowledge irreconcilable differences” or the “irretrievable 
breakdown of their marriage.7 The timing could not have been better 
by 1970 the divorce boom was in foil sw.ng and divorce cases were 
clogging the courts.
In almost every state prior to 1970, one spouse had to sue the 
other to establish “fault” and thereby obtain a divorce decree9 
Grounds for divorce varied widely across the states, with adulteiy and 
abandonment almost universally recognized.10 Ending a marriage 
could be a complicated, embarrassing, and expensive undertaking in 
he era of fault-based d ^orce.11 Consider the charade people went 
rough to sue for divorce on grounds of adultery, often when there had 
been no adultery. The usual practice was to hire a professional “co­
respondent, nominally an adulterer, along with a photographer 12 
Compromising photographs coupled with false testimony would then 
be presented m court to obtain a divorce decree.13 Everyone present 
was aware that the adultery may never have occurred.14
This system had numerous liabilities. The tolerance of perjuiy is
D i v o r c e e s  ReCO™ f ration ° f  the Effect o f  No-Faul, Divorce on
j-w a f s  £  r s  r
Maiyland, and Oklahoma had no-fault laws on the books as early as 1953 but in an era 
f  low divorce rates they attracted little attention. Id. The same cannot be said
S n0t° riety as a divorce mil1- which extended back at least to the 
/o Z e /1 AC,eT T  .See, g e "era,/y  Robert Wemick, Where You Went i f  You Really H ad  
to Get Unhitched: In the Days When Divorced Still Were a Sin and a Shame the City
Catf n g ‘°  D ° mestic Disharmony, 27 Smithsonian
0 ( l yyo) (discussing Reno as a mecca for the maritally troubled)
Press S n  ^  DiV° rCe tn WeS,em Law 81 (Ha™ d  U.
987)- The details o f  divorce law continue to vaiy in the no-fault era For
1 ance some countries require separation prior to divorce. See generally id. at 80-81 
o. See Glenn, supra n. 6, at 1023. '
9. Id. at 1024.
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the Knot: A Short History o f  Divorce 102-107 (CambridgeU Press 1991) 'P$’
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id
14. Id.
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deplorable, but doubtless many perjurers felt their transgressions were 
outweighed by intolerable marital problems. Furthermore, the cost o f  
photographers, co-respondents, and trial lawyers made divorce more
expensive than it had to be.
The human costs were equally great. Suing for adultery in the 
absence of any actual infidelity was doubtless embarrassing, especially 
for the party alleged to have taken part in the extramarital affair 
Actual court proceedings could be even more humiliating as evidenced 
by the 1920 case of a Los Angeles man who charged his wife with 
wearing a bathing suit “designed especially for the purpose o 
exhibiting to the public the shape and form of her body, an appetite 
for beer and whisky,” and a ' ‘desire to sing and dance at cafes and 
restaurants for the entertainment of the public.’ ” If such allegations 
were hard on the aspiring divorcees, consider their effect on a y 
children involved: one parent, however innocent, had to be at fault 
besmirched by tawdry legal proceedings. Perhaps advice c°lurrans 
Ann Landers best summed up the moral failings of fault-based divorce 
when she complained about the humiliation at having to sue her former 
husband for cruel and unusual punishment when he had been, in er 
opinion, neither cruel nor unusual.16 In more recent years fault-based 
legal proceedings often became pro forma, but a contested divorce 
could still engender considerable shame, acrimony, and expense.
Given that no-fault laws and the boom arrived at about the same 
time questions of cause and consequence were inevitable Most 
researchers have concluded that no-fault laws had little overall impact 
on divorce rates.17 Nevertheless, no-fault laws have been reviled as a 
primary cause of modem family breakdown. This understanding has 
motivated the modem divorce reform movement, characterized by 
attempts to repeal or weaken no-fault laws. I now turn to the divorce
15 May, supra n. 10. at 1. r
16 Ann Landers The Ann Landers Encykopedia, A to Z: Improve io u r Life 
Emotionally, Medically, Sexually, Socially, Spiritually, (Random House Publishing
19]7 } See e.g. Glenn, supra n. 6, at 1023; H. Elizabeth Peters, C a r r i a g e  and Divorce: 
Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 The Am. Eeon. Rev. 437, 4 6 
448 (1986)- Robert Schoen, Harry N. Greenblatt & Robert B U itiks, California 
Z e r i e n c e  vUh No-Fault Divorce, 12 Demography 223 (1975); Justin Wolfers i ^  
Unilateral Divorce Lavs Raise Divorce Rates’  A Reconciliation and New Results I
13, http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/Divorce.pdf (last accessed Mar. 1,
2005).
reform movement in detail, with particular attention to the covenant 
marriage laws of Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas, the divorce reform 
movement’s landmark triumphs to date.
II. Th e  D iv o r c e  R e fo r m  M o v e m e n t
In recent years, many people have identified high divorce rates as 
a social problem that threatens America. It is well-known that divorce 
can have negative consequences for both parents and children. No­
fault divorce laws have been frequently blamed for the divorce boom 
taking place between 1965 and 1979 despite considerable evidence to 
the contrary. The most commonly proposed solution to America’s 
divorce problem” is to repeal or weaken these laws, thereby 
preserving more intact families and reducing the societal ills attributed 
to high divorce rates.
Concern with high divorce rates and “family breakdown” is by no 
means a modem phenomenon. By the 1860s divorce law had become 
more liberal than ever before, although the acceptable grounds for 
marital dissolution varied widely across states.19 Divorce has 
increased steadily since the Civil War,20 the first time rates could be 
reliably tracked. The casus belli for opponents of divorce -  more 
divorce coupled with easier divorce laws -  were therefore in place 
with predictable results. In 1867, for example, Yale University 
President Theodore Woolsey denounced “corruption in the family, as 
manifested by connubial unfaithfulness and divorce”; Americans’ 
destiny, he continued, “depends on our ability to keep family life pure 
and simple. The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed a 
spate of anti-divorce activism, with more than 100 pieces of restrictive 
legislation passed by state governments.^
With the 1965-1979 divorce boom exceeding any other in 
American history, it is little surprise that attention has turned once 
again to the question of divorce reform. One difference from previous 
efforts concerns the invocation of social science research. Whereas 
tum-of-the-century condemnation of high divorce rates resorted to
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18. Glenn, supra n. 6, at 1024.
19. See generally Blake, supra n . 11; Phillips, supra n. 10.
20. May, supra n. 10, at 4.
21. Wemick, supra n. 6, at [If 4],
22. Blake, supra n. 11, at 131.
23. See generally May, supra n. 10, at 4.
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moral arguments,24 modem divorce reformers base their proposals on 
hard data: marital disruption can have devastating effects on women s 
incomes and, more notably, offspring’s well-being. This provided 
the ammunition activists and politicians could use to push divorce 
reform forward. Representative Tony Perkins, sponsor of the 
Louisiana Covenant Marriage law, made this point in a 1997 interview:
Well, legislatures around the country are continually dealing with 
issues trying to create new laws to address teenage pregnancy, 
juvenile delinquency . . .  a number o f these issues. And now what 
the social sciences are telling us [is] that these issues trace right 
back to broken homes.
24. See generally William L. O’Neill, Divorce in the Progressive Era  (Yale U. 
Press 1967).
25. This is certainly true, but many of the works cited in defense of these points 
have overstated their claims due to sampling issues. For years an assertion that 
divorced women’s standard of living declined seventy-three percent was the estimate 
most often cited by policy makers and others. Lenore J. Weitzman The Divorce 
Revolution 323 (The Free Press 1985). It was not shown to be in error for more than 
ten vears See  Richard R. Peterson, A Re-evaluation o f  the Economic Consequences o 
D i v o Z 61 Am. Sociological Rev. 528, 528 (1996). SimUarly, Judith Wallerstein’s 
often-criticized research has frequently been cited to demonstrate that divorce has 
adverse effects on children. Compare Judith S. Wallerstem & Sandra Blakeslee^ 
Second Chances: Women, Men, and Children a Decade after Divorce (Ticknor & 
Fields 1989) (discussing children’s lives after divorce, focusing on their relationships 
with parents and peers and what happened to the parents after divorce); Judith S. 
Wallerstein, & Joan B. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope 
with Divorce, (Basic Books 1980) (discussing the importance of what happens after 
divorce, the importance of father-child relationships regardless of the frequency of 
contacts, and examines children’s reaction to these changes in their lives), Judi . 
Wallerstein Julia M. Lewis & Sandra Blakeslee, The Unexpected Legacy o f  Divorce. 
A 25 Year Landmark Study (Hyperion 2000) (based on a twenty-five year study about 
the lives of children, now adults, whose parents divorced: describing the feelings, 
expectations, and memories of divorce that these children earned into adulthood 
especially in their own relationships -  love, marriage, cohabitation, divorce, and 
becoming parents themselves) with Andrew J. Cherlin, Going *  Extremes. Famify 
Structure, Children's Well-Being, and Social Science 36 Demography 421 422 (1999), 
Andrew J. Cherlin, Generation Ex- 271 The Nation 62, 63 (2000); Katha Pollitt Socml 
Pseudoscience 271, The Nation 10, 10 (2000) (critiquing Wallerstein). Divorce 
certainly can have adverse consequences for women and children, but nowhere near as 
severe as that depicted by Weitzman and Wallerstein.
26 PBS NewsHour, “Bound by Love?” H 8] (PBS Aug. 20, 1997) (online 
newshour, transcr. available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july- 
dec97/marriage_8-20.html).
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The timing was right for a resurgence in public condemnation of 
divorce. No-fault laws had been in place for some time when the 
divorce reform movement reappeared in the 1990s, providing policy 
makers with ample opportunity to capitalize on the putative 
consequences of divorce depicted in the work of Judith Wallerstein, 
Lenore Weitzman, and others. Their research spurred on conservative 
activists; divorce^reform legislation was introduced in over thirty 
states in the 1990s. Language urging the reconsideration of no-fault 
divorce appeared in the 2000 Republican Platform.29
Most of the state-level efforts at divorce reform have failed. The 
first success did not come until 1997, with passage of the Louisiana 
Covenant Marriage law. 0 Similar legislation was enacted in Arizona 
the following year, followed by Arkansas in 2001.32 All three 
measures created two-tiered marriage systems: couples could opt for 
either traditional unions, dissolvable under no-fault statutes or 
covenant marriage. 3 The latter effectively reintroduced fault-based 
divorce law; petitioners had to prove adultery, abuse, or similar 
egregious conduct. In the absence of such transgressions, couples 
have to separate for one or more years before a divorce decree will be 
granted. Furthermore, counseling must be obtained prior to obtaining
27. See e.g. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage? A Change in Culture 
fo r  the Sake o f  the Children, 46 La. B.J. 116, 118 (1998).
28. The Lewin Group et al., State Policies to Promote Marriage: Preliminary 
Report, Different Laws for Couples with Children, Such as Requiring Parents to 
Attend Education on the Effects of Divorce” (2002) (available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/marriage02/marr-rpt.htm) (last accessed Mar, 18, 2005).
29. The Republicans: Excerpts from  Platform Approved by Republican National 
Convention, N.Y. Times A 16 (Aug. 1, 2000) (available at 2000 WLNR 3282479).
30. 1997 La. Sess. L. Serv. 1380.
31. Ariz. Sess. L. ch. 135 (1998).
32. 2001 Ark. Acts 1486. See  Steven L. Nock, James D. Wright & Laura Sanchez 
America's Divorce Problem, 36 Socy. 43, 43-44 (1999); Ross A. Thompson & Jennifer 
M. Wyatt, Values, Policy, and Research on Divorce: Seeking Fairness for Children in 
R.A. Thompson & P.R. Amato, The Postdivorce Family: Children, 'Parenting, and 
Society 191 (Sage 1999) (discussing the passage of the Louisiana bill and the divorce 
reform movement m general); see also The Lewin Group et al., supra n. 28 (reviewing 
recent state-level legislation affecting divorce law).
33. Ariz. Sess. L. ch. 135, at § I; 2001 Ark. Acts 1486, at § 25-901- 1997 La Sess 
L. Serv. 1380, at § 1. ’ ' '
34. 2001 Ark. Acts 1486, at § 5.
35. Id.
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a divorce.36 Of the three states, Arizona’s covenant marriage law is the 
most liberal. Fault-based statutes or prolonged separation only applies 
if one spouse contests the divorce.
Covenant marriage has not caught on so far. In 1998, less than 
two percent of Louisiana newlyweds opted for covenant marriages. 
These unions do appear to have lower divorce rates, although the 
difference is largely due to the fact that only couples less prone to 
ending their relationships are likely to choose the covenant option in 
the first place.3  ^ Even if divorce rates are lower, covenant marriage 
laws may not have reduced the suffering attributed to divorce. One 
potentially adverse consequence is to trap children in damaging, high- 
conflict marriages. This Article will return to this topic later.
Despite its apparent lack of appeal in Louisiana, divorce 
reformers have not given up on covenant marriage. It appeared in the 
plank offered in 2000 by the Marriage Movement, an eclectic group of 
clergy, scholars, and state politicians.39 Attracting national attention, 
the Movement offers numerous ideas for strengthening marriage. 
One of these is covenant marriage; another is proposed legislation to 
uniformly weaken no-fault laws:
Reconsider no-fault divorce laws and find innovative new ways to 
give legal weight to the marriage vow. For example, a longer
36. Id. at § 3.
37. Laura Sanchez et al., The Implementation o f  Covenant Marriage in Louisiana, 9 
Va J. Soc. Pol. & L. 192, 198 (2001). The minuscule numbers of covenant marriages is 
partially attributable to low levels of awareness among Louisiana citizens, not to 
mention lack of understanding and enthusiasm by civil servants processing marriage 
applications. Id. at 197 tbl. 5 (indicating civil service workers do not ask couples 
applying for marriage licenses to choose the covenant marriage option because of 
workers’ own lack of knowledge, training, and moral beliefs on covenant marriage), 
see also Pam Belluck, Stales Declare War on Divorce Rate Before Any "I D o s," N.Y. 
Times Al (Apr. 21, 2000).
38 Laura Sanchez et al.. Cati Covenant Marriage Foster Marital Stability among 
Low-Income, Fragile Newlyweds? 22 (Natl. Poverty Conf. on Marriage & Farn  ^
Formation Among Low Income Couples: What Do We Know from Research; 
Washington, D.C., Sept. 2003) (available at
http'.//www.npc.umich.edu/news/events/past/SanchezNock.pdf).
39 Karen S Peterson, The Matrimony Manifesto Coalition Takes up Arms against
USA’s ‘Culture o f  Divorce' USA Today 9D (June 29, 2000) (available in LEXIS, 
News Library).
40. Id.
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waiting period (at least eighteen months for contested no-fault
divorces), slows down the divorce process . . . 41
Given the thousands of academics, theologians, public officials, 
and concerned citizens listed as signatories to its mission statement, the 
Marriage Movement exemplifies American concern with divorce. 
Inspired by such broad-based support, some of the divorce reform 
legislation now under consideration may well become law.
III. Wh a t  R e c e n t  Re se a r c h  S a y s  a b o u t  D iv o r c e  R efo r m
This Article contends that it is in the best interest of America’s 
families to keep no-fault divorce laws on the books. This argument is 
premised on the abatement of three negative consequences of divorce, 
which has occurred in large part because divorce has become less 
stigmatized. The weakening of no-fault divorce laws could recreate 
many of the conditions that once exacerbated divorce’s negative 
consequences.
III. A. T h e  C h a n g in g  C o n se q u e n c e s  o f  Pa r e n t a l  D iv o r c e
Many researchers have argued that the normalization of divorce 
in contemporary America has weakened its negative impact on 
children. Goldscheider and Waite foresaw this development but did 
not attempt to verify it.42 Amato and Keith, through an exhaustive 
meta-analysis of almost 100 studies, found that the average negative 
effect of growing up in a divorced family has declined over time.43 
Parental divorce had far more adverse consequences for offspring self­
concept and mother-child relations in the 1950s and 1960s than in more 
recent decades. Another study found that parental divorce had fewer 
negative effects, on survey respondents interviewed in 1976 than it did 
for a comparable sample from 195 7.44 Taken together, these results
41. Marriage Movement, The Marriage Movement: A Statement o f  Principles 23 
(2000) (available at 
http://www.marriagemovement.org/pdfs/The%20Marriage%20Movement- 
A%20Statement%20of%20Principles.pdf).
42. Frances K. Goldscheider & Linda J. Waite, New Families, No Families? The 
Transformation o f  the American Home 99 (U. of Cal. Press 1991).
43. Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being o f  
Children: A “Meta-Analysis, "  110 Psychol. Bull. 26, 40  (1991).
44. Richard A. Kulka & Helen Weingarten, The Long-Term Effects o f  Parental
provide evidence that the effects of parental divorce have diminished 
over time. These findings have been corroborated m two recent
studies 45
III.A. 1. Parental Divorce and Offspring Marriage Timing
The relationship between parental divorce and marriage timing 
has changed over time.46 Numerous studies have demonstrated that 
parental divorce affects offspring marital behavior although little 
consensus existed as to whether the children marry earlier or later than 
people from intact families 47 My research, summarized m l- .gure , 
analyzes the 1973-1994 General Soc.al Survey to show how the effects 
of parental divorce have changed over time 48 Compared to people 
from intact families, teenagers from divorced famil.es have extremely 
high marriage rates across the study, but they are much lower in 1994
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than in 1973.49
Divorce in Childhood in Adult Adjustment. 35 The J. of Soc. Issues 50 73 ( 1979^
45. Nicholas H. Wolfinger, “Family Homogamy": ^
Parm er Selection and Marital Stability, 32 Soc. Sci. Research 80-97 (2<X>3)
46 See generally Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Understanding the Divorce Cycle. Hov. 
Parental Divorce Affects Offspring Marital Behavior (Cambridge U. Press forthco g
20! ? '  Jiang H. Li & Roger A. Wojtkiewicz, Childhood Family Structure and Entry 
into First Marriage, 35 The Sociological Q. 247, 247-248 (1994).
48. Infra Fig. 1 (comparing the rates of teen marriage among teenagers of dtvorced
families).
49. Id.
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Figure 1. Changing Rates of Teenage Marriage for the Children 
of Divorce
Source: Wolfmger (2003, 2005); 1973-1994 General Social Survey.
The most likely explanations for the declining rate of teenage 
marriage for the offspring of divorce stems from the likelihood that the 
typical modem divorce involves less conflict and upheaval than it once 
did. When divorce was less common, couples needed greater 
justification to dissolve their marriages. In the absence of no-fault 
divorce laws, a couple desiring a divorce often needed to demonstrate 
total and absolute marital failure.51 Normative expectations persuaded 
quarreling couples to “stick it out” under circumstances such as 
domestic violence, that would today be readily recognized as 
reasonable grounds for divorce.52 When couples finally ended their 
marriages, the situation may have deteriorated far more than is typical 
in most modem divorces.
The majority of modem divorces do not involve extensive
50 Nolo, No Fault Divorce vs. Fault Divorce FAQ
http://www.nolo.eom /article.cfm /ObjectID/6191B9DC-OOBF-42CA- ’
A 5A D A 95C 2A E C 5196/ catID / 995E E 405-21A A -4B 4A -
97CBA BD 905A37E1B/118/246/222/FAQ / (last accessed Mar. 18, 2005).
51. Id. at “Do All States Allow a ‘Fault’ Divorce?”
52. Id. at “What Is a ‘Fault’ Divorce?”
2005] M IXED  BL ESSIN G S
417
conflict.53 Conversely, it is impossible to know for certain whether 
only the very worst marriages were dissolved in years gone by. But if 
we accept this proposition, it follows that children used to be exposed 
to far more conflict than is typical in most modem divorces. In days 
gone by, the conflict associated with parental divorce may have pushed 
teenagers into premature marriage as a means of escaping an 
acrimonious home life. If parental divorce is now less unpleasant than 
it used to be, teenagers will feel less pressure to leave Consequently 
their marriage rates have been lower in recent years. Many of the 
negative consequences of growing up in a divorced family can be 
linked to parental conflict, 5 so declining conflict should have other 
beneficial effects on the rate of teenage marriage. Compared to people 
from intact families, the children of divorce are ^disproportionately 
likely to become sexually active at a young age and to become 
pregnant out of wedlock.5’  Parental divorce even accelerates the onset 
of menstruation in young women.58 Without a doubt, early sexual 
activity increases, if unintentionally, the chances of early wedlock. 
Thus a decline in parental conflict may have benefited the children of 
divorce by reducing the incidence of behaviors that may ultimately lead 
to high teenage marriage rates.
53. Paul R. Amato & Alan Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing Up in an Era o f  
Family Upheaval 220  (Harvard U. Press 1997).
54. Douglas J. Besharov & Karen N. Gardiner, Trends in Teen Sexual Behavior 1 -2
(1998) (available at http://www.welfareacademy.org/conf/papers/dougmay.pdf).
55. Paul R Amato & Alan Booth, Consequences o f  Parental Divorce and Marital 
Unhappiness for Adult Well-Being, 69 Soc. Forces 885. 905-914 (1991); Robert. E. 
Emery, lnterparental Conflict and the Children o f  Discord and Divorce, 92  Psychol. 
Bull. 310, 310-330 (1982); Robert E. Emery, Marriage, Divorce, and Childrens  
Adjustment xii (Sage Publications 1988).
56. Chris Albrecht & Jay D. Teachman, Childhood Living Arrangements and the 
Risk o f Premarital Intercourse, 24 J. of Fam. Issues 867, 867 (2003); sec  Mignon R. 
Moore & P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Sexual Intercourse and Pregnancy among 
African American Girls in High-Poverty Neighborhoods: The Role o f  Family and 
Perceived Community Environment, 63 J. of Marriage & Fam. 1146, 1146 (2001).
57. Moore & Chase-Lansdale, supra n. 56, at 1154; Lawrence L. Wu, Effects o f  
Family Instability, Income, and Income Instability on the Risk o f a Premarital Birth, 61 
Am. Sociological Rev. 386, 386 (1996).; Lawrence L. Wu & Brian C. Martinson, 
Family Structure and the Risk o f  a Premarital Birth, 58 Am. Sociological Rev. 210, 
2 10(1993).
58. See generally E. Mavis Hetherington, An Overview o f  the Virginia Longitudinal 
Study o f Divorce and Remarriage with a Focus on Early Adolescence, 7 J. of Fam. 
Psychol. 3 9 ,4 4  (1993).
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Very few people would argue with the idea that teenage marriage 
is undesirable. Perhaps the most important reason is the strong 
relationship between youthful marriage and divorce.59 Other things 
being equal, a couple with a mean marriage age of twenty is a third less 
likely to divorce than one with a mean marriage age of eighteen.60 
Furthermore, people who marry young are less likely to remain in 
school.61
III. A.2. Trends in the Intergenerational Transmission of Divorce
A second consequence of parental divorce to weaken over time is 
its transmission between generations (in other words, the increased 
likelihood of ending one’s own marriage as the result of growing up in 
a divorced family). 2 Figure 2 shows a dramatic weakening in the rate 
of divorce transmission. General Social Survey respondents from 
divorced families interviewed in 1973 were 126 percent more likely to 
have dissolved their own marriages than were people from intact 
families.63 By 1994, the disparity had declined to forty-five percent.64 
Part of this decline can be attributed to the reduction in youthful 
marriage for the children of divorce described in the previous section 
of this Article. After controlling for age at marriage, the figures for 
1973 and 1994 shrink to ninety-four percent and thirty-three percent
59. See Tim B. Heaton, Factors Contributing to Increasing Marital Stability in the 
United States, 23 J. of Fam. Issues 392, 395, 405, 406 (2002); Matthew D. Bramlett & 
William D, Mosher, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the United 
States 37 (Natl. Ctr. for Health Statistics Ser. 23, No. 22, July 2002) (available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf).
60. Estimate produced by the author using data from the National Survey of 
Families and Households. James A. Sweet & Larry L. Bumpass, The National Survey 
o f  Families and Households - Waves I and 2: Data Description and Documentation
(1996) (available at http://www.sscwisc.edu/nsfh/home.htm) [hereinafter Sweet & 
Bumpass, National Survey]; James A. Sweet, Larry L. Bumpass, & Vaughn R. A. Call, 
The Design and Content o f  the National Survey o f  Families and Households (Ctr. for 
Demography & Ecology 1988) [hereinafter Sweet, Bumpass & Call, Design and 
Content],
61. Jay D. Teachman & Karen A. Polonko, Marriage, Parenthood, and the College 
Enrollment o f  Men and Women, 67 Soc. Forces 512, 512, 520, 521 (1988).
62. Nicholas H. Wolfmger, Trends in the Intergenerational Transmission o f  
Divorce, 36 Demography 415, 415 (1999).
63. Infra Fig. 2 (illustrating trends in the intergenerational transmission of divorce).
64. Id.
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respectively 65 Still, a strong trend remains.
« _ J ^ » ™ ^ OTC^ ^ H ^ yiU)VOCAcy







120% ] - —
£
i l 100% j - - _












»Wergenerational Transmission of 
Divorce
Nooontrofs ... x 
---------------------------- ----  ' Controlling for marriage s
. ^ » r 0 « „ 7 s
-------- J
attributed i f S t e f c o  ° f  f V° ri 6 Can largc|y be
People from intact famines, the children of C° mpared to
divorce as a solution to difficulties in th • 1V° rC0 m° re ° ften use 
People from intact families. ° Wn marnages than do
certainly ch T g T d L el’S e 11 T y Z L T l  C° mmitment h«  almost 
neighborhood to end their marriage ft T o  " T  ^  ° " ly ° neS ln the 
lesson about the permanence of marital ^  m° re
soaety. Children learned that m m  , han U does in today’s 
sour, that the test solution to m a r i t a V S  b* foisaken when *  went 
losses. In contrast, no matter how M ' f i  ultles was to cut one’s 
divorce does not stand out against the e* ’ ■ “  *  time’ a modern 
therefore does not send nearly as strone of one’s peers and
result, people are now less likely to S  T 8C t0 Ch' ldren- A* a
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that parental divorce conveys a weaker message about marital 
commitment than it once did. This is similar to an argument made to 
account for demographic differences in the divorce cycle. Divorce 
transmission is weaker in populations with high divorce rates, as 
speculated, because marriage itself is seen as less inviolable.67 If this 
logic is applied historically, it portends a weakening in the divorce 
cycle.
Another argument to explain trends in the intergenerational 
transmission of divorce concerns the declining stigma o f growing up in 
a single-parent family. Throughout the twentieth century people 
became increasingly accepting of divorce,68 a trend that increased 
especially quickly between the early 1960s and the late 1970s.69 As 
divorce became more common and acceptable, perhaps children in 
divorced families suffered less stigma, either real or imagined.70 In the 
past, when divorces were few and far between, single mothers and their 
children were frequently harassed or ostracized.71 Under these 
conditions children were less likely to develop normal relationships, 
with their mothers, grandparents, or their peers. The children of 
divorce could hardly avoid seeing themselves as deviant. In modem 
times one’s post-divorce relationships sometimes cushion the blow of 
parental divorce. In days gone by, the children of divorce usually faced 
only stigma. Without a doubt this added to the psychological trauma of 
experiencing parental divorce, given the powerful relationship between 
stigma and personal identity, and thereby increased the chances of
67. See  Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem o f Divorce 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. 
Roundtable 517, 526 (1995).
68. See  Phillips, supra n. 10, at 246.
69. Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes toward Family Issues in the United States,
51 J. of Marriage & Fam. 873, 873 (1989); Arland Thornton & Linda Young-DeMarco, 
Four Decades o f  Trends in Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States: The 
1960s through the 1990s, 63 J. of Marriage & Fam. 1009, 1010 (2001).
70. Just how much have the social norms surrounding divorce changed in the last 
fifty years? Adlai Stevenson’s divorce probably contributed to the failure of his 
presidential campaigns, with voters in 1952 more concerned with his marital problems 
than the threat of domestic communism. Wemick, supra n. 6, at 4]; see Angus 
Campbell et a l ,  The American Voter 51 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1968). One voter 
told a reporter in 1953: “Young man, the American people proved once and for all last 
November that we will never tolerate a divorced man in the White House.” Wemick, 
supra n. 6, at p| 3]. Twenty-seven years later, Ronald Reagan’s divorce was the non­
event of his presidential campaign. In 1996, previously divorced Bob Dole ran for 
president on a family values platform.
71. See generally Phillips, supra n. 10.
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having difficulty in one’s own marriage.72
III.B. T h e  E co n o m ic  C o n se q u e n c e s  o f  D iv o r c e  fo r  Wo m en
Opponents of easy divorce laws often cite the grim economic 
condition of single mothers to justify stringent divorce laws. The 
Louisiana covenant marriage legislation was motivated in part by the 
economic consequences of divorce:73 poverty rates for single-mother 
families have traditionally been five times those of two-parent 
families.74 Moreover, Pamela Smock showed almost no change in the 
economic costs of marital disruption for women from the late 1960s 
through the mid 1980s. ' The lack of progress has been largely 
attributed to the unequal distribution of assets following divorce, low 
female participation in the labor force, and limited job skills among 
those who did work.76
But much of this has changed. Table 1 displays various social 
and demographic characteristics for divorced women in 1980 and 2001 
that are related to earning potential.77 The data comes from the March 
Demographic Supplement of the Current Population Survey; all 
changes are significantly different except for coresidence with 
parents.78 Between 1980 and 2001, divorced women’s labor force 
qualifications increased considerably.79 Twenty-nine percent of 
respondents from 1980 did not have high school diplomas.8 By 2001,
72. See generally Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management o f  Spoiled 
Identity (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963).
73. Spaht, supra n. 27, at 117.
74. Irwin Garfinkel & Sarah S. McLanahan, Single Mothers and Their Children: A 
New American Dilemma 14 fig. 1 (The Urban Inst. Press 1986).
75. Pamela J. Smock, The Economic Costs o f  MaritaI Disruption fo r  Young Women 
Over the Past Two Decades, 30 Demography 353, 353 (1993).
76. Matthew McKeever & Nicholas Wolfmger, Reexamining the Economic Costs o f  
Marital Disruption fo r  Women, 82 Soc. Sci. Q. 202, 202-203 (2001) (citing Greg J. 
Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Economic Consequences o f  Marital Instability, in 
Horizontal Equity, Uncertainty, and Well-Being 427 (U. of Chi. Press 1985)) 
[hereinafter McKeever &Wolfinger, Reexamining]; Richard R. Peterson, Women, 
Work, and Divorce (St. U. of N.Y. Press 1989); Smock, supra  n. 75.
77. Infra Tbl. 1 (illustrating the changing sociodemographic characteristics of  
divorcees).
78. United States Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey: Annual 
Demographic File, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, D.C. (2001).
79. Infra Tbl. 1.
80. Id.
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Two 1 7 1 0
Three or more 9 4
Children younger than six 1 4 % 6 %
Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding error. 
Figures are weighted. Ns are 4,142 for 1980 and 4,541 for 2001. 
Source: McKeever and Wolfinger (forthcoming).
’Means reported for those who are currently working 
bMeans reported for those who received given type of aid; amounts 
expressed in 2 0 0 1  dollars, with 1980 dollar amounts in parentheses 
‘No statistically significant change between 1980 and 2001
These and other developments have finally begun to affect
divorced women’s economic prospects. Although divorced women
still suffer economically, their median income losses after divorce have
declined significantly in recent years. This undercuts another rationale
for restricting divorce. A recent analysis based on the National Survey
of Families and Households (NSFH)87 indicates that divorce now has
88smaller effects on women’s incomes than it did in the past. Table 2 
contrasts the NSFH estimates of the costs of divorce, measured in per 
capita income, with those obtained by earlier studies. Divorce now 
costs the median woman fourteen percent of her per capita income, a 
much lower figure than had been reported previously. 9 By way of 
contrast, studies based on data from 1970 to 1983 suggested income 
losses averaging thirty percent.90 A fourteen percent loss of per capita
87. Sweet & Bumpass. National Sin’vey, supra n. 60; Bumpass & Call, Design and 
Content, supra n. 60.
88. McKeever & Wolfinger, Reexamining, supra n. 76, at 203; see also Matthew 
McKeever & Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Shifting Fortunes in a Changing Economy: 
Trends in the Economic Well-Being o f  Divorced Women in Fragile Families and the
Marriage Agenda ___  (Kluwer forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter McKeever &
Wolfinger, Shifting].
89. Infra Tbl. 2 (changes in the economic well-being of divorced women).
90. See generally Annemette Sorensen, Estimating the Economic Consequences o f 
Separation and Divorce: A Cautionary Tale from  the United States, in Economic
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meomc; still represents a marked decrease in quality of life but the fact
S b T  hr “ r provm“ ' S"86' SB thMget better. Divorced women s economic gains can be attributed chieflv
women a H IU,°ratiVe ^  f° rCe ParticiP^on  among divorced
men, and secondarily to lower rates of marital fertility.91












IV. S u m m a riz in g  th e  E v id e n c e  a g a in st  F a u l t -Ba se d  D iv o r ce
d iv o r c r ia ts to " !0/ 6 ^ 6 ^introducing toughdivorce laws would recreate many of the conditions that used to make
91. McKeever & Wolfmger, Shifting, supra n. 88, at _  (forthcoming 2005).
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divorce harder on children. Parents would wait longer before 
dissolving disastrous marriages, thereby subjecting children to more 
conflict. The stigma of divorce would intensify if couples again had to 
demonstrate legal fault in order to dissolve their marriages. Finally, 
parental divorce would send children a stronger message about marital 
commitment than it does now, thereby increasing the chances that they 
would end their own marriages.
As the consequences of growing up in a divorced family abate, 
divorce reformers may focus renewed attention on the often dire 
economic straits of single mothers. Their concern has merit, given that 
poverty rates for single mother families are traditionally far higher than 
for two-parent families. In the last twenty years, however, divorcees 
have made substantial economic gains, largely on account of their labor 
force participation. Divorce still takes a toll on women’s incomes, but 
not nearly as severe as it did in the past. This undercuts a key rationale 
for limiting access to divorce.
There is wisdom in viewing any new body of findings with 
caution, particularly if they are to be the basis of policy decisions. For 
this reason we should consider some of the negative implications of the 
developments this Article describes. The first concerns the changing 
marital behavior of people from divorced families. Although lower 
rates of teenage marriage are certainly a welcomed development, the 
other side of the coin has been lower marriage rates across the board 
for the children of divorce. In 1973, people from divorced families had 
much higher overall marriage rates than did people from intact 
families,9 owing largely to extraordinarily high levels of teenage 
wedlock. By 1994, the children o f divorce were thirteen percent less 
likely to marry than were their peers from intact families.9 Although 
teenagers from divorced families still had high marriage rates in 1994, 
their chances of matrimony plummeted if they remained single past age 
twenty.94 This is probably because teenagers from divorced families 
increasingly opted for cohabitation in lieu of marriage.95
Certainly, many people who remain single throughout their lives 
are happy in doing so, but marriage remains the normative experience
92. Supra Fig. 2 (illustrating marriage rates among children who were raised in 
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for almost everybody -  about ninety percent of Americans will wed at 
some point in their lives.96 Moreover, married people typically report 
greater emotional well-being than do those who remain single.97 
Although it is still good news that the children of divorce have lower 
teenage marriage rates than they used to, their declining overall 
marriage rate is noteworthy.
Another development that might be a mixed blessing for the 
children of divorce concerns the circumstances under which people 
choose to end their marriages. While it is certainly good news that 
people are less likely to stay in high conflict marriages than they used 
to, it is also cause for concern if the majority of divorces nowadays 
come after virtually no conflict.98 Ending a low-conflict marriage may 
hurt children as much as staying in a high-conflict family.99 
Nevertheless, there is certainly a break-even point at which children’s 
well-being is best served if their parent’s marriage is dissolved.100
The final reasons for keeping no-fault laws on the books are 
moralistic, and go beyond the ethical dilemmas presented by perjury in 
divorce trials. The traditional alternative to divorce, especially in the 
absence of adequate means to buy a “trip to Reno,” was permanent 
separation. Numerous unhappy couples effectively ended their 
marriages in this way.102 In the absence of a paper trail, it is 
impossible to know how many. Because most of those who opted for 
permanent separation did not want to spend the rest of their lives alone 
adultery or even bigamy ensued.103 South Carolina stands out as an 
extreme example of the folly of prohibiting divorce.104 Having no
96. Joshua R. Goldstein & Catherine T. Kenney, Marriage Delayed or Marriage 
fo rego n e?  New Cohort Forecasts o f  First Marriage for U.S. Women 66 Am
Sociological Rev. 5 0 6 ,5 0 7 (2 0 0 1 ). ' ’ '
97 Linda J. Waite & Maggie Gallagher, The Case fo r  M arriage: Why Married  
People Are Happier. Healthier, and Better o ff Financially, 67-68 (Doubleday 2000).
98. See Amato & Booth, supra n. 53, at 220.
99 Amato & DeBoer, supra n. 66, at 1049; Paul R. Amato, Laura Spencer Loomis
t  , 4 j  w *h’ ? aren,a] Divorce. Marital Conflict, and Offspring Well-Being during 
tarty Adulthood, 73 Sociological Forces 895, 909 (1995).
100. Amato, Loomis & Booth, supra n. 99, at 913.
101 Laurie Nichol, Your California Legal Separation Advisor,
nttp.//legaladvice.articleinsider.com/56387_califomia_legal_separation html f t 21 (last
accessed Mar. 18, 2005); see  Blake, supra n. 1 ], at 155-159.
102. Blake, supra n. 11, at 143-144.
103. M a t 234.
104. Id.
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divorce laws until fairly recently, it fostered peculiar conditions for 
marriage.105 In the mid-nineteenth century, laws had to be passed 
limiting the amount of money a man could bequeath to his mistress, 
given the popularity of engaging in extramarital relations in lieu of 
divorce.10 Moreover, such arrangements offered no solution for the 
female half in such loveless marriages. By demonstrating one limit of 
legislating morality, these nineteenth century laws are instructive to 
those who object to divorce on moral grounds.
V. Ot h e r  Wa y s  o f  R e d u c in g  D iv o r c e
Although many people feel the divorce rate in contemporary 
America is too high, not all agree that tougher divorce laws are a good 
way to preserve marriage. Some contend that families can best be kept 
together through governmental programs that make life easier for 
married couples.1®  The scope of ideas is extensive, ranging from 
increased financial assistance to poor married coupLes to government- 
sponsored training in relationship skills.109 Some programs have 
already been implemented. Recently the federal tax burden incurred by 
poor married couples was reduced, while certain states have begun 
marriage education programs.110
Do these programs help keep marriages together? For the most 
part it is too soon to tell.111 One mark in favor of these programs is 
that they can’t hurt. People may object to government-subsidized 
marital education as a waste of taxpayers’ money or an unwarranted 
intrusion into people’s private lives, but it is hard to imagine that the 
newlyweds learning about happy marriages might actually be harmed 
in the process so long as the government does not use marriage 
programs as an excuse to curtail more vital services. On the other
105. Id.
106. See generally id. at 219.
107. See generally id.
108. See e.g. Theodora Ooms, M arriage Plus, “Help Those Who Want to Stay
Married,”  http://www.prospect.Org/print/V13/7/ooms-t.html (Apr. 8, 2002).
109. Besharov & Gardiner, supra n. 54, at Ex. 2.
111. Scott M Stanley, Making a Case fo r  Premarital Education, 50 Fam. Rel. 272,
278 (2001). . .
112. Dawne Moon & Jayecee Whitehead, Marrying fo r  America: A Feminist 
Discursive Approach to National Intimacy, in Fragile Families and the Marriage 
A genda___ (Kluwer forthcoming 2005).
430 W H ITTIER JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FA M ILY  AD VO CA CY [Vol. 4:2
hand, the discouraging legacy of tough divorce laws is hardly in 
question.
Though not formally associated with the marriage movement, one 
auspicious development in all fifty states has been the elevation of the 
minimum marriage age to eighteen.113 Until recently, for instance, 
women could wed at fifteen in Mississippi.114 Given the high divorce 
rates for teenagers chronicled earlier in this Article, the prohibition of 
youthful marriage may eventually contribute to lower divorce rates.
In many states the legal minimum marriage age of eighteen can 
be waived by parental or judicial consent, or premarital pregnancy.115 
Marriage between teenagers may be desirable when babies are 
involved, but the merits of youthful marriage via parental or judicial 
approval seem suspect. This is a potential area for legal reform on the 
part of the marriage movement. In addition, we might do more to 
discourage matrimony among eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds. As of 
2000, about five percent of American teenagers were married.116 
Perhaps marriage education programs might seek to persuade teenagers 
to delay marriage until their twenties, given the high divorce risk 
youthful couples face.117
113. Marriage Laws, Teen Marriage Laws, 
http://usmarriagelaws.com/search/united_states/teen_marriage_laws/index.shtml (last 
accessed Mar. 18, 2005).
114. PopPolitics, Attitudes Toward Marriage, “Statistics,” 
http://www.poppolitics.com/articles/2000-06-19-stats.html (last accessed Mar. 23, 
2005) (noting that minimum age for women to marry in Mississippi without parental 
consent was fifteen in 2000).
115. Marriage Laws, supra n. 113.
116. Daniel T. Licher & Zhenchao Qianh, Marriage and Family in a Multiracial 
Society tbl., 
http://www.prb.org/Template.cfm?Section=PRB&template=/ContentManagement/Con 
tentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=12035 (last accessed Mar. 18, 2005).
117. Naomi Seller, Is Teen Marriage a Solution? 1 (Ctr. for L. & Soc. Policy Apr. 
2002) (available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/teenmariage02-20.pdf).
